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1 Introduction
In light of the concerns faced by policy makers regarding the long-run funding of public
pensions, many countries have initiated reforms. Apart from the need to restore sustain-
ability of pension systems, these reforms are importantly motivated by the concerns about
the potentially adverse consequences of existing systems for labor market incentives. For
these reasons, most countries have initiated reforms that i) strengthen the tax-benet link
by, for instance, bringing more people into a harmonized pension system in which pen-
sions are assessed on the basis of past earnings; and ii) introduce more actuarial fairness
in order to provide disincentives, or penalties, for early retirement and to improve the
incentives for labor market participation of older workers nearing retirement. It has been
long recognized that the tax character of pension contributions tends to discourage work
e¤ort of the actively employed (intensive labor supply). This has led policy makers to
propose a tighter tax-benet link to reduce distortions in the labor supply decision faced
by younger workers. More recently, the date, or timing, of the retirement decision has
received increasing attention. To raise the average retirement age, recent reforms often
include adjustments of the pension size to provide stronger incentives for continued work
(extensive labor supply).
What is less well-known are the important interactions between the incentives facing
younger and older workers. Rewarding late retirement might have quite adverse conse-
quences for implicit taxes faced by younger workers. While some approaches to pension
reform might succeed in strengthening labor supply on both margins, by encouraging
work e¤ort of younger workers and simultaneously participation of older workers, other
scenarios might encourage one margin at the expense of the other, with possibly no clear
cut net e¤ect on aggregate labor supply. The goal of this paper is, then, to develop a for-
mal model that helps to clarify how incentives of young and old workers interact and how
pension reform might give rise to o¤-setting, or mutually, reinforcing e¤ects on aggregate
labor supply.
There is a large literature on pension economics and old age insurance; see, for example,
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Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Bovenberg (2003), Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Fenge
and Pestieau (2005) for a few important reviews.
The recent policy debate in the U.S. has focussed to a great extent on the choice
between increased capital funding [e.g. Kotliko¤(1997), Feldstein (2005a,b), and Feldstein
and Samwick (2002)] versus parametric reform of existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems
[e.g. Diamond (2004), Diamond and Orszag (2005)]. Apart from its impact on national
savings, the potential labor market implications of public pensions have always played
an important role in this debate. An on-going concern is the e¤ect on intensive labor
supply, i.e. hours worked by the active generation. The crucial question is to which
extent the contributions to social security are actually perceived as a tax by the active
generation. The answer depends, of course, on the institutional design of the PAYG
system. In a system with a tax-benet link in which pensions are based on past earnings,
the e¤ective tax rate may be roughly half of the statutory contribution rate, as recent
calculations for Germany by Fenge and Werding (2004) have shown. Beginning with
Feldstein and Samwick (1972), the existing literature has calculated a much higher tax
component for young workers far from retirement, while the e¤ective tax is, in contrast,
much lower for workers nearing retirement. Disney (2004) provided recent calculations
of the e¤ective tax rates implied by PAYG contributions and econometric estimates of
the employment e¤ects. The results are consistent with usual ndings of the empirical
literature on intensive labor supply, namely that male employment is not particularly
responsive to tax incentives, while womens activity rates are highly adversely a¤ected by
the e¤ective contribution tax.
According to the inuential studies of Gruber and Wise (1999a, 1999b, 2002), a seri-
ous problem associated with PAYG systems is that they impose signicant disincentives
to work at older ages. Gruber and Wise (2005) provide calculations for the relationship
between later retirement and the amount of additional benets that lead to actuarial
fairness. Börsch-Supan (2000, 2003) provides evidence on participation decision of older
workers for Germany. Scarpetta (1996) nds empirical evidence supporting this phenom-
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enon in a cross-country study. A major factor behind the trendtoward early retirement
in developed economies is that existing PAYG systems distort the labor supply decision
on the extensive margin and thereby encourage early retirement. Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998) suggest that early retirement provisions in many countries have led to a dramatic
decrease in the labor force participation among older workers. The fact that benets are
not adjusted in an actuarially fair manner is a key reason for this large distortion on the
extensive margin. Theoretical work on the implications of social security for the retire-
ment decision is inspired by the seminal contributions of Feldstein (1974) and Diamond
and Mirrlees (1978). More recent theoretical contributions on the (optimal) design of
pension systems in the presence of a retirement decision is found, for example, in Cremer
and Pestieau (2003) and Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004).1
The novel contribution of this paper is to shed more light on how the structure of
existing PAYG pension systems simultaneously a¤ect the intensive and extensive margins
in di¤erent ways. In particular, the paper will show how the e¤ective tax rates on intensive
labor supply of younger workers and the participation tax rate of older workers, and
therefore the extensive and intensive labor supply responses, importantly interact with
each other, depending on the specic institutional design of the system. We are able to
provide a sharper characterization of the excess burden of a PAYG pension system that
brings out the parallels with the recent literature, found in Kleven and Kreiner (2006),
Immervoll et al. (2007) and Saez (2002), on labor taxation in the presence of intensive and
extensive supply. We show how the excess burden depends i) on the behavioral elasticities
with respect to prime-age labor supply and the retirement decision of older workers and
ii) on the e¤ective tax rates for these two groups. We then turn to parametric pension
reform and derive the behavioral response and welfare implications of strengthening the
tax-benet link and introducing more actuarial fairness by making the pension eligibility
rules more sensitive to the choice of the retirement date. These are important reform
strategies chosen by numerous countries in the recent past. To our knowledge, a rigorous
1See Fenge and Pestieau (2005) for a review of this work.
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analysis of a marginal reform of the tax-benet link by making it more sensitive with
respect to retirement age is also novel.
To focus on the essential mechanisms, the model we consider is a simple one. Agents
are risk neutral, live two periods, make an intensive labor supply decision when young
and an extensive, participation choice in the second period of life. Production technology
is Ricardian and labor markets are competitive. Consumer-workers make their choices
subject to a general pension earnings rule that conveniently parameterizes di¤erent degrees
of actuarial fairness and encompasses the most important specications of actual pension
systems: i) a Beveridge-type system in which atold-age earnings are independent of
contributions; ii) a Bismarckian PAYG system that incorporates a constant tax-benet
link, although one that is not sensitive to the chosen retirement age and is, thus, unfair in
an actuarial sense; iii) a modied PAYG system that adjusts actuarially the pension rule
according to the participation decision in the sense of Gruber-Wise; and iv) a fully-funded
system in which contributions earn the market rate of interest and pension earnings are
adjusted to take into account the length of the retirement period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the households and
their intensive and extensive labor supply decisions in view of the structure of the PAYG
system. This part of the paper also outlines the equilibrium OLG structure and calcu-
lates the responses of intensive and extensive work e¤ort to a socioeconomic trend toward
early retirement, including its impact on the pension system. In section 3, we introduce
the welfare measure, compute the consequences of a higher statutory contribution rate,
and characterize the marginal excess burden resulting from the expansion of the system.
Section 4 is devoted to parametric pension reform including several scenarios of strength-
ening the tax-benet link and introducing a greater degree of actuarial fairness. The
paper closes in section 5 with a brief summary.
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2 The Model
2.1 Households
In order to concentrate on labor market behavior of young and old workers, we keep
the macroeconomic framework as simple as possible. Regarding representative consumer-
workers, we assume they live two periods and are risk neutral. Leaving aside issues related
to savings, we make the simplifying assumption that present and future consumption, Ct,
t = 1; 2, are prefect substitutes.
In other words, agents care only about the present value and not the timing of con-
sumption. In assuming a Ricardian framework, labor productivity is the same in both
periods and is xed at unity. With competitive labor markets, the (real) wage is also
unity, MPL = W = 1, and there is no unemployment.2 We specify further that agents
face the choice of how hard to work when young and when to retire when old. The
former is an intensive labor supply decision, L, while the extensive labor supply margin
reects a discrete participation decision of whether to work at all. The retirement date
is denoted by x and corresponds to the share of the overall old age period spent in active
employment. First and second period budgets are
C1 = (1  )WL  S; C2 = x  (1  )W + (1  x)  P +RS; (1)
where S is savings,  is the statutory contribution rate to the pension system, P represents
pension earnings, and R ( 1 + r) is the (constant) interest factor. During the second
period of life, the agent continues working for a share x of the entire period and retires for
the remaing part 1 x. We refer to the variable x as the retirement date. Upon retirement,
wage earnings are replaced by pension income. To further simplify, we assume that labor
supply in the second period is xed.
Life-time utility of an agent is of the usual intertemporally separable form. For simplic-
ity, we exclude income e¤ects on labor supply and additionally assume that consumption
2We retain in this section the symbol W for expositional convenience.
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and work e¤ort are separable within each period,
V = C1   ' (L) + 1
R
 [C2    (x)] ; (2)
where the parameter  scales the preference for early versus late retirement. Disutility
of work e¤ort ' (L) when young and of continued employment  (x) during old age are
convex increasing, i.e. the derivatives '0, '00, 0, 00 are all positive. Given that present
and future consumption are perfect substitutes, the interest rate must be equal to the
rate of time preference and is, thus, exogenous.
Since it is crucial in analyzing alternative pension policies, we must describe in detail
the factors inuencing pension earnings, P . They are given by
P = m (x) [ WL Rp +  Wx] +B; (3)
where B is a atpension payment independent of contributions. The pension system
might pay interest on contributions, which is reected in the factor Rp. The key rela-
tionship in our analysis is the conversion factor m(x) that scales contributions from past
earnings into a pension entitlement. It reects the tax-benet link that can be actuarially
adjusted depending on old-age labor market participation, or retirement, decision x. The
specication (3) encompasses several distinct pension regimes: i) a Beveridge-type system
(m(x) = 0) in which atold-age earnings are independent of contributions, P = B; ii) a
Bismarckian PAYG system that incorporates a constant tax-benet link, m(x) = m0 > 0,
with B = 0 and Rp = 1. If the conversion factor does not increase in the retirement
date, the system remains unfair in the sense that pension adjustment does not reect the
length of the remaining life-time 1   x; iii) a modied PAYG system with an actuarial
adjustment of pensions conditional on the retirement date (Gruber-Wise incentives),
m0(x) > 0; and iv) a fully-funded system in which contributions earn the market rate of
interest, Rp = R, and pension earnings are adjusted to take into account the length of
the retirement period so that m(x) = 1=(1  x).3
3As Feldstein (2005a) points out, the absence of a tax-benet link implies that an agents contributions
represent a 100% tax rate. Regarding PAYG systems with a tax-benet link, Fenge and Werding (2003)
provide evidence that approximately 50% of contributions in Germany are e¤ectively taxed.
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To model the implications of a number of structural pension reforms, we assume that
the tax-benet link m(x) takes the specication
m = m(x) =

1  x +m0;  > 0; (4)
which embeds an actuarial adjustment component (=1   x) and a constant term m0
scaling the tax-benet link. Actuarial adjustment is partial if 0 <  < 1 and complete
if  = 1. Given (3)(4), the Bismarck-type pension equals P = m0 [L+ x]W , while
its fully capital funded counterpart is P = (1  x) 1  [L R + x]W , with B = m0 = 0.
Substituting the pension formula of the funded system into the budget identities of the
agent shows that life-time wealth is independent of the parameters of the pension system,
i.e. C1+C2=R = WL+xW=R. The fully funded system provides a perfect substitute for
private savings in this framework.
Substituting the budget identities into the value function V yields the problem
V = max
L;x
(1  )WL  ' (L) + 1
R
[x (1  )W + (1  x)P    (x)] ; (5)
subject to P determined by (3)(4). The optimality condition with respect to a young
workers labor supply decision is
'0 (L) = (1  L)W; L =   [1  (1  x)m Rp=R] < ; (6)
where L is the implicit tax rate on rst-period employment L in the sense of Feldstein and
Samwick (1992). It will be discussed more fully below. The participation, or retirement,
decision of an older worker is governed by
0 (x) = (1  )W   P + (1  x) @P
@x
; (7)
where the derivative in the last term,
@P
@x
=   [m0  (LRp + x) +m]W; (8)
reects the e¤ect on pension earnings of choosing a longer working life x. Since (6)(8),
together with the economys resource constraints, determine the equilibrium response of
workers to pension policy, it is important to analyze these conditions in more detail.
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2.2 Intensive Labor Supply
Observe in (6) that the implicit tax L on intensive labor supply is less than the statutory
rate  . In a system with a tax-benet link, pensions are assessed on the basis of past
wage earnings. Greater work e¤ort by the young therefore raises not only their current
income, but also leads to higher retirement income when old. This means that not all
of the contribution rate is perceived as a pure tax, since agents foresee an individual
return in terms of a higher pension entitlement accruing in the retirement period 1   x.
Moreover, the simple relationship in (6) contains the essential insights regarding intensive
labor supply.
First, when contributions earn no interest (Rp = 1) under a PAYG system, future
benets are discounted by the market interest rate. The younger an agent, the more
distant are future pensions, and, hence, the larger is the discounting. For this reason,
empirical calculations, such as in Feldstein and Samwick (1992) or Fenge and Werding
(2003), show that implicit tax rates tend to be rather high for younger workers and fall
as the retirement date approaches. Second, if the retirement age x increases, pensions
are consumed for a smaller remaining retirement period. If the conversion factor is not
increased simultaneously, a higher retirement age raises implicit tax rates on the young and
lead to a larger distortion of intensive labor supply. Third, the formula nests the extreme
cases of at PAYG (Beveridge) and fully funded systems. In a at system without any
tax-benet link, m = 0, pension contributions are e¤ectively taxed at the statutory rate,
L =  . In contrast, L is zero under the fully funded system. The fully funded system
pays full interest on contributions, Rp = R, and also adjusts pension size in an actuarially
fair way, m = (1  x) 1, to take account of the length of the remaining retirement period.
Note that a Gruber-Wise adjustment for late retirement adjusts the conversion factor
in a similar way and, hence, reduces the implicit tax on young workers. However, since
contributions earn no interest, this adjustment is not su¢ cient to entirely eliminate the
implicit tax on the young.
Calculating the intensive labor supply response in (6) in terms of proportional rates
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of change yields
L^ =    ^L;   '0=(L'00) > 0; (9)
where ^L  dL=(1   L) and  is the (constant) net wage elasticity of work e¤ort.4
Clearly, a rise in the implicit tax rate L reduces rst-period labor supply. As argued
above, the implicit tax rate depends, through the tax-benet link, on the retirement date
x. We now set RP = 1, an assumption we employ in the rest of the paper, and use
m  (1  x)m0 = m0 from (4) to obtain
^L =
m0x
(1  L)R  x^: (10)
Consequently, intensive labor supply of young workers is linked to the retirement behav-
ior or extensive labor supply of old agents, according to
L0(x) =
dL
dL
 dL
dx
=  	 < 0; 	  L
1  L 
m0
R
> 0; (11)
reecting the fact that longer working life raises the e¤ective tax rate on young workers.
2.3 Retirement Decision
It is assumed that continued employment leads to progressively increasing disutility of
labor market participation of older workers. The retirement decision in (7) balances the
marginal cost of labor market participation 0 (x) against the income di¤erential between
wages and pension earnings that becomes available by postponing retirement by another
instant. The impact of the pension system on retirement behavior can be summarized by
a single e¤ective tax measure that is obtained upon rewriting (7) as
0 (x) = (1  R)W; R   + P
W
  1  x
W
@P
@x
; (12)
where R is a participation tax rate, often called the implicit retirement tax.
4For a variable y, y^ represents the relative change y^  dy=y. The change in the tax rate is relative to
the tax factor, ^  d= (1  ).
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It summarizes all scal incentives and disincentives for retirement in a single metric,
which consists of: i) the wage taxes paid on a workers salary, ii) the pension foregone
with continued employment, and iii) the pension increase over the remaining retirement
period if the system incorporates actuarial adjustment. To obtain the participation tax
rate, all the costs and benets are expressed as a percentage of a workers gross wage. The
implicit retirement tax, so termed in the literature on pension economics, is entirely
parallel to the participation tax analyzed in the literature on extensive labor supply by
researchers such as Saez (2002), Immervoll et al. (2007), and Kleven and Kreiner (2006).
Note, in particular, how an actuarial adjustment of pensions in the sense of Gruber and
Wise, (@P=@x > 0), lowers the e¤ective retirement tax. This adjustment compensates for
prolonged contribution payments due to continued work and a shorter retirement period
and, hence, a shorter period of pension take-up. In a Beveridge type system without a
tax-benet link (m = 0) and, thus, with a at pension, the retirement tax would equal
R =  + P=W , i.e. the sum of the contribution plus the replacement rate. Finally, the
retirement tax is zero (R = 0) in the fully funded system. In this case the pension is
increased in an actuarially fair way when retirement is postponed, in order to compensate
for the extra contributions and foregone pensions over the longer contribution period and
the shorter duration of benets.
To measure how retirement behavior responds to scal incentives, we calculate the
log-derivative of (12),
x^ =   

^R + ^

;   
0
x00
> 0: (13)
The parameter  expresses the elasticity of labor market participation. Participation
declines and retirement occurs earlier when the e¤ective tax rate R increases. A larger
disutility  from continued work is meant to reect exogenous socioeconomic factors
leading to a trend to earlier retirement that will be explored in greater detail below.
Since the participation tax rate R is a function of x, it is important to explore its
properties further. Since wages are xed, we let P = pW and B = bW , and rst rewrite
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pension earnings in (3) as
p = m (x) z(x) + b; z(x) = L (x) + x; (14)
where z determines the pension assessment base. The participation tax rate becomes
R   + p  (1  x) p0; p0  @p=@x: (15)
With an earnings-linked pension formula such as (14), pension entitlements become
sensitive to the retirement date via three channels: i) postponing retirement augments
the pension assessment base by prolonging the active working period in old age, which
translates into a higher pension depending on the conversion factor m; ii) postponing
retirement increases, however, (see (10)), the implicit tax rate on young workers, thereby
discouraging intensive labor supply L and shrinking the assessment base, which leads to
smaller pensions; and iii) the system could directly encourage postponed retirement by
raising the conversion factor m. For convenience, we employ primes to denote the partial
derivatives ofm, z and p with respect to x. The rst two e¤ects are summarized by z0 > 0,
which is positive if the intensive labor supply elasticity is not too large.5 The last e¤ect
is m0  0, and will be zero if the system provides no actuarial adjustment with respect to
the retirement date. The sensitivity of pension size with respect to the chosen retirement
date is thus
p0 =   [zm0 +mz0] > 0; p00 =   [2z0m0 + zm00 +mz00] : (16)
We next analyze the e¤ect of an extended working life on the participation tax. Dif-
ferentiating (15) with respect to x, substituting (16), and using (1  x)m00 = m0 and
m  (1  x)m0 = m0 from (4), we obtain
@R
@x
  0R =   [2m0z0   (1  x)mz00]  0; (17)
5To guarantee z0 = 1+L0 > 0, we assume 	 < 1 (see equation (11) above), which holds for su¢ ciently
small values of m0 and .
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where z00 = L00 < 0.6 Postponed retirement raises (resp. leaves una¤ected) the partic-
ipation tax. If there is no tax-benet link, the participation tax rate is independent of
the retirement date. If the conversion factor remains xed and excludes any actuarial
adjustment (m0 > 0 and  = 0), then z0 > 0 > z00, implying a higher participation tax
due to postponed retirement,  0R > 0. If, instead, the conversion factor is actuarially ad-
justed to the retirement date (m = = (1  x) and m0 = 0), the participation tax is also
independent of the retirement date. In this case, with (1  x)m = , retirement behavior
does not inuence the implicit tax on the young, so that rst period labor supply remains
una¤ected and the assessment base satises z0 = 1 and z00 = 0.
2.4 Equilibrium
Our model is very stylized with only three overlapping generations and two periods. The
focus is on generation 1 which is young in period 1 and old in period 2. To close the model,
we assume the existence of an initial old generation of pensioners (generation 0) which
coexists in period 1 with a young generation 1. We further assume a future generation of
workers in period 2 which lives for one period and coexists with generation 1 when it is
old. The upper index identies generations 0 oldand f future, while variables without
an upper index refer to the active generation 1, which is the only generation living over
the entire two period life-cycle. The only activity of the old generation 0 is to consume
PAYG pensions that must be paid from the contributions of generation 1
C0 = P 0; V 0 = C0=R: (18)
Since our focus is on the behavior of generation 1, we assume away labor market par-
ticipation on the part of generation 0. In other words, it is fully retired. The counterpart
of generation 0 is a futuregeneration, which lives for only one period and inelastically
supplies one e¢ ciency unit of labor. In period 2, both the young and the old of generation
1 receive a competitive wage W = 1. Members of the future generation are assumed to
6Observe that z00 is negative. Given the assumption  < 1, (10)(11) imply z00 = L00 =   1 L 	2 < 0.
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be fully employed. Their sole activity is to consume xed labor earnings, after paying
contributions to nance pensions of the then old generation 1. This reects the fact that
any PAYG pension system basically redistributes from future to present generations:
V f = Cf = (1  )W: (19)
The budgets of the PAYG system in periods 1 and 2 are
p0 = L; (1  x) p =   (1 + x) : (20)
We again employ the normalization P 0 = p0W and P = pW . In the second period, 
represents the contributions from the future generation and x from the active part of the
old of generation 1. Consequently, the pension is partly funded by an intergenerational
transfer.7 For the rest of the paper, we maintain W = 1 and suppress W .
Given a Ricardian technology, output in period 1 is simply L. Substituting (20) into
the budget identity (1) and using (18) yields the GDP identity L = C1 + C0 + S for the
rst period. Output is spent on consumption by young and old agents and on private
investment S.8 In the second period, new output 1 + x is produced by generation 2 and
by the still active part of generation 1. To obtain output market clearing, we aggregate
(1) and (19) and substitute for (20) to yield: C2 + Cf = 1 + x + RS. Second period
GDP equals new output plus the yield on rst period investment. Since the world ends
thereafter, output is fully consumed.
2.5 Early Retirement
The equilibrium of the economy is fully characterized by a retirement age x and a at,
lump-sum pension b that simultaneously satisfy the extensive labor market condition (12)
7In the funded system, the budget would apply to each person separately, making the generational
account zero and eliminating intergenerational redistribution: (1  x) p =   (LR+ x).
8The investment technology is linear with coe¢ cient R and present and future consumption are perfect
substitutes. Since it is not required for the present purposes, we intentionally leave savings and investment
undetermined in our model. Alternatively, we could impose a small open economy assumption.
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and the budget constraint (20).9 The linearized versions of these two conditions, which
take into account the intensive labor supply choice in (11), are derived in the appendix
see (A.2) and (A.4) and are illustrated in the (x; b) plane by Figure 1. The retirement
condition describes a downward-sloping relationship, since a higher at pension makes
early retirement more attractive, which reduces the retirement age. In contrast, the
budget condition is upward-sloping, since the PAYG system can support a greater level
of at pensions over the remaining retirement period when the working life of agents is
extended. The intersection of the two (linear) relationships determines the equilibrium
values of x and b.
b
x
PAYG budget
( )b x
+
retirement
( ; )x b b
- -
b
Fig. 1: Early Retirement
Before proceeding with an analysis of parametric pension reform, we rst illustrate
how an exogenous trend toward early retirement alters labor market choices on both
margins and a¤ects the pension system. An early retirement trendresults from exoge-
nous socioeconomic factors and is modeled by an increase in the preference parameter 
that determines the disutility of old-age labor market participation. Holding the pension
9Our subsequent analysis refers, then, to a dened contribution system in which the contribution rate
is xed and pension size must ultimately be adjusted to guarantee the systems solvency.
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parameters xed, equations (A.2) and (A.4) then simplify to
x^ =   
1 + "
 db
1  R  

1 + "
 ^; db = Rx
1  x  x^; (21)
which we solve for the equilibrium responses:
x^ =   
1 + "
 1r  ^ < 0;
db =   Rx
1  x 

1 + "
 1r  ^ < 0; (22)
r  1 + R
1  R 

1 + "
 x
1  x > 0:
Not surprisingly, a preference shift toward early retirement reduces participation in
the old-age labor market, x^ < 0.
Furthermore, it requires budget consolidation to keep the system sustainable, and,
consequently, leads to pension cuts, db < 0, as Figure 1 illustrates.10 Interestingly, early
retirement also reduces the implicit retirement tax rate in equilibrium,
^R = "  x^+ db
1  R < 0: (23)
The result is, again, quite intuitive. Not only does the participation tax decline when the
at portion b of the overall pension falls, it also declines with an earlier retirement date.
The latter e¤ect occurs via "   0Rx= (1  R) and is present only if the earnings-linked
part of pension earnings is relatively insensitive to variations in retirement behavior. In
this case the conversion factor depends largely on the xed termm0 and does not compen-
sate su¢ ciently in terms of pension supplements p0 received for the prolonged contribution
and shorter retirement periods. This, in turn, magnies the imbalance between the mar-
ginal returns and costs of postponing retirement, implying that the participation tax rate
increases with the retirement date,  0R > 0. Correspondingly, the participation tax rate
10Observe, however, that an explicit consolidation is necessary only when the system is not actuarially
fair in the sense of Gruber and Wise and features a positive R. An actuarially fair system with R = 0
consolidates automatically, since earlier retirement reduces the conversion factor, reecting the resulting
longer retirement and shorter contribution periods.
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declines when agents retire earlier. This reduction, of course, tends to encourage later
retirement, but cannot o¤set the trendto early retirement from the original preference
shock.
Irrespective of whether the system includes an actuarially fair adjustment for changes
in the length of the retirement period, we nd, interestingly, that early retirement raises
intensive labor supply of younger workers. Using (9)(11), we obtain
^L =
m0x
(1  L)R  x^ < 0 ) L^ =    ^L > 0: (24)
The intuition for this result is best understood by reference to the Bismarckian system
with a xed conversion factor, m = m0. In this case contribution payments yields pension
gains earlier in life and over a longer retirement period when the retirement date is moved
forward. Therefore, the implicit tax rate dened in (6) must fall, stimulating intensive
labor supply. Moreover, even if the conversion factor m includes an actuarial component,
the implicit tax rate on the young falls, as long as the reduction in the conversion factor
is insu¢ ciently great.11
3 E¢ ciency of Public Pensions
3.1 Welfare Measure
We need a consistent welfare metric to judge the e¢ ciency of pension systems. To this
end, we use the PAYG budgets in (20) to restate indirect utility of all three generations:
V 0 = p0=R = L=R;
V = (1  )L  ' (L) + [x (1  ) + (1  x) p   (x)] =R; (25)
V f = (1  ) = (1  ) +   (1 + x)  (1  x) p:
11The implicit tax rate on intensive labor supply is independent of retirement behavior only if the
conversion factor depends exclusively on retirement duration, i.e. m0 = 0 and m = = (1  x) imply a
constant L =  (1  =R).
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The utilitarian social welfare function, also employed by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), is
the discounted sum of individual utilities
 = RV 0 + V + V f=R = L  ' (L) + 1
R
[1 + x   (x)] ; (26)
where the second equality follows upon substituting (20). This welfare function exclusively
reects economic e¢ ciency and does not incorporate distributional concerns.12
Given that intensive and extensive labor supply are the only behavioral margins, the
welfare e¤ects of pension policy must be proportional to changes in x and L. Taking the
di¤erential of (26), substituting for the private choices of work e¤ort and retirement in
(6) and (12) and letting W = 1, we nd
d = [1  '0 (L)] dL+ 1  
0 (x)
R
dx = L  dL+ R
R
 dx: (27)
Note that the coe¢ cients on dL and dx for the change in welfare d reect the di¤erences
between the social and private returns of a marginal increase in hours worked, 1 vs. 1 L,
and in the retirement date, 1 vs. 1  R. Substituting for L^ and x^ from (9) and (13) (and
holding ^ = 0), the welfare e¤ects become
d = LL  L^+ Rx
R
 x^ =  L  L  ^L   R   x
R
 ^R: (28)
The welfare impact of any behavioral changes induced by pension reform is, to the rst
order, proportional to the e¤ective tax rates on work e¤ort and old age participation.
The pension system is the only source of ine¢ ciency in our simple framework. If it were
absent, allocation would be Pareto optimal. Introducing small contributions and pension
entitlements would, to the rst order, entail a zero marginal welfare impact.
3.2 Higher Statutory Tax Rate
To study the labor market impact and the e¢ ciency e¤ects of PAYG pensions, we rst
consider an increase in the statutory contribution rate  . Since the analysis of the general
12This is less restrictive than it seems. As in Keuschnigg (1994), one could analytically separate
e¢ ciency from intergenerational redistribution. In Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000), this decomposition
was used to construct an (ex ante) Pareto-improving reform.
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case is quite complex, we concentrate on three specic scenarios to bring out the main
message of our analysis. First, we consider complete actuarial fairness in the sense that the
unfunded system adjusts the earnings-linked pension to take into account the length of the
retirement period. This case emphasizes that while actuarial adjustment in the sense of
Gruber andWise eliminates the distortion in the retirement date, it is insu¢ cient to ensure
that the labor market is neutral with respect to the pension system. The second scenario
assumes a xed labor supply of younger workers and incomplete actuarial adjustment in
the pension formula. Here, we show that a Bismarkian system with a xed tax-benet
link mitigates, but does not remove, the distortion in the retirement decision. The third
scenario entirely eliminates any tax-benet link and considers the labor market impact
of at pensions unrelated to past earnings. The succeeding section will then characterize
the excess burden of this case, where labor market is distorted both on the intensive and
extensive margins.
Actuarial Fairness: A number of countries have reformed their earnings-linked PAYG
system by including pension supplements in the sense of Gruber and Wise to compensate
for postponed retirement. If the pension rule is made su¢ ciently sensitive to the choice of
retirement date and adjusts the conversion factor in an actuarially fair way to reect the
longer contribution period and the shorter length of the remaining retirement period, all
distortions with regard to labor market participation of older people can be eliminated. In
our simple framework, this calls for a conversion factor in (4) equal to m (x) = 1= (1  x)
with  = 1 and m0 = 0. In this case, (1  x)m0 = m. Since it implies 	 = 0, we nd
from (B.5) in the appendix that the direct e¤ect of the contribution rate, for any given
retirement date x, on the participation tax rate is zero, @R=@ = 0. To understand why,
one must note that the fair conversion factor (1  x)m = 1 eliminates any sensitivity of
the implicit tax rate L with respect to the retirement date so that intensive labor supply
of younger workers becomes independent of the retirement decision. Consequently, the
sensitivity of the assessment base z = L + x with respect to retirement reduces to the
retirement margin only, z0 = 1 (which obviously leads to @z0=@ = 0). The increase in the
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assessment base z0 on account of a longer contribution period, and any direct impact @z=@
of the rst period labor supply response on the assessment base, are fully translated into
an adjustment of the pension size so that the e¤ective retirement tax is una¤ected. Using
in (B.3) the fact that a fair system is characterized by (1  x)m0 = m, (1  x)m = z0 = 1
and @z0=@ = 0, and substituting into (B.1), indeed proves @R=@ = 0.
However, this does not mean that such a system does not inuence the retirement
date. The level of the participation tax rate is positive as long as there is a at, lump-
sum pension, R = b. To see this, note the pension formula p = mz + b, with p0 =
 [m0z +mz0]. Using z0 = 1, (1  x)m0 = m as well as (1  x)m = 1 in (15) conrms the
result. If the higher contribution rate raises extra revenues beyond what is needed to pay
for the higher earnings-linked pensions, the at pension b becomes more generous, which,
in turn, raises the participation tax rate and leads to earlier retirement.
The extent of the tax revenue increase depends, of course, also on the resulting inten-
sive labor supply response. Even if the system is actuarially fair with respect to the retire-
ment date, the implicit tax rate on young workers is still positive, L =   (1  1=R) > 0,
since an unfunded system does not pay interest on accumulated contributions. An increase
in the statutory contribution rate thus raises the e¤ective tax component on contributions
and discourages intensive labor supply. To verify these statements, we solve the system
stated in (A.2) and (A.4). Since z0 = 1 and m0 = z00 = 0 in the present scenario, we have
 0R = 0 in (17), which eliminates the elasticity " from the resulting expressions. Together
with @R=@ = 0, the system reduces to
x^ =   
1  R  db; db =
Rx
1  x  x^+

b

+
L
1  LmL

 d ; (29)
where the terms in square brackets replaces the one in (A.4). To see this, note that the
PAYG budget constraint in (20) and the pension formula imply 1+x
1 x = p= = mz + b= .
Using this expression and combining with (B.2)(B.3) yields the term in square brackets
in (29).
The resulting solution is illustrated as in Figure 1. The budget line shifts up in
response to the rise in  , while the position of the retirement locus remains unchanged.
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Consequently, agents retire earlier, and the system a¤ords a more generous at pension
component. The comparative static solution, using (29), corresponds to
x^ =   
1 R
1
r
h
b

+ L
1 LmL
i
 d < 0;
db = 1r
h
b

+ L
1 LmL
i
 d > 0;
r = 1 + R
1 R
x
1 x:
(30)
We have thus seen that expanding the system with an actuarially fair adjustment of the
conversion factor not only pays for a more generous earnings-linked pension, but also for a
higher at pension. The latter e¤ect raises the participation tax rate and results in early
retirement. In addition, the implicit tax rate on the young L =   (1  1=R) increases,
because the adjustment of the conversion factor cannot undo the fact that contributions
in an unfunded system pay no interest and, thus, partly represent a tax on the young
that distorts intensive labor supply, L^ =    ^L < 0. By (28), aggregate welfare declines
on both margins. The welfare loss would be zero on the extensive retirement margin if,
in the initial equilibrium, the at pension and, thus, the participation tax rate were zero:
R = b = 0.
Fixed Labor Supply of Young Workers: When labor supply is completely insen-
sitive to variations in e¤ective wages ( = 0), the pension assessment base z = L + x
depends only on changes in the retirement date (z0 = 1), so that @z=@ = @z0=@ = 0. In
evaluating the impact of the statutory contribution rate on the participation tax rate, we
nd from (B.1)(B.5)
@R=@ = 1  +m0 [z   (1  x)]  0: (31)
We assume in this scenario that the conversion factor m is imperfectly fair as it in
fact is in most countries and allow for arbitrary parameter values  2 [0; 1] and m0.13
13With z0 = 1, (15) and (16) imply R = b+  [1  +m0 (z   (1  x))]. The second term shows how
the earnings-linked pension leads to a positive participation tax rate. If it were positive and, thus, unfair
initially, then the participation tax will increase with a higher contribution rate.
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If the conversion factor were fair,  = 1 and m0 = 0, a higher contribution rate would
not a¤ect the participation tax rate.
We now solve for the equilibrium impact of the policy change. With xed labor supply,
@p=@ = mz. The PAYG budget constraint (20) implies (1 + x) = (1  x) = p= while the
pension formula is rearranged to yield mz = (p  b) = . Substituting this expression into
the term square brackets in (A.4), the equilibrium system (A.2) and (A.4) simplies to
x^ =   
1+"
1
1 R

db+ @R
@
d

and db = Rx
1 x  x^+ b  d . Noting the denition of r > 0 in
(22), the corresponding solution is
x^ =   1
1 R

1+"
1
r
 
b

+ @R
@
  d < 0;
db =   1r
h
R
1 R
x
1 x

1+"
@R
@
  b

i
d :
(32)
The interpretation is of (32) straightforward. If the system is unfair with respect to
the length of remaining retirement, as in the standard Bismarckian system with a xed
tax-benet link m0, the agent looses when retiring an instant later. The net e¤ect of the
extra contribution plus pension foregone minus the present value of the increase in future
pensions reects a positive participation tax. The loss on the extensive margin induces
agents to retire earlier, thereby worsening the systems budgetary position. Consequently,
the retirement date declines and the at pension is reduced to keep the system sustainable
(if b is not too large initially). As a check on consistency, a fair system would involve
p = mz with b = 0 and m = 1= (1  x), implying @R=@ = 0, as argued above. There
would then be no e¤ect on the retirement date.14 Given the impact on retirement, the
implication for economic e¢ ciency in (28) is also clear. With a positive participation tax,
retirement already occurs ine¢ ciently early, so that an expansion of the system can only
reinforce this distortion and lead to further e¢ ciency losses.
Flat Pensions: Labor market distortions are at their highest, if pensions are lump-sum
from an individuals perspective and completely unrelated to past earnings. The absence
of a tax-benet link is given by  = m0 = m = 0, reducing the pension formula to
14The system would still redistribute intergenerationally, an issue that we do not analyze here.
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p = b. The e¤ective tax rates on the intensive labor supply of younger workers and on the
participation of their older counterparts are L =  and R =  + p, respectively. Clearly,
the participation tax rate is independent of the retirement date, implying  0R = " = 0.
The absence of a tax-benet link also implies @p=@ = 0 and, of course, @R=@ = 1.
In this case, the system in (A.2) and (A.4) reduces to x^ =   
1 R [db+ d ] and db =
Rx
1 x  x^+ 1+x1 x  d , yielding a solution
x^ =    ^R =   

1+x
1 x + 1

1
r
d
1 R < 0;
db =
h
1+x
1 x   R1 R x1 x
i
1
rd > 0;
r = 1 + R
1 R
x
1 x:
(33)
An increased contribution rate in a system without tax-benet link leads to earlier
retirement and more generous at pensions. The pension level grows less than propor-
tionally, because earlier retirement erodes the tax base, depending on the magnitude of
the participation distortion R and the extensive elasticity . The increase in the e¤ective
tax rate L =  also reduces rst period labor supply and the welfare of young workers.
3.3 Excess Burden
This subsection provides a sharper characterization of the e¢ ciency loss from expanding
a PAYG pension system without a tax-benet link. The absence of a tax-benet link
and the assumption of intertemporally separable preferences imply that pension budgets
and labor market behavior can be analyzed independently in each period without any
spillover. Although special, this case allows for a particularly simple and illuminating
characterization of the excess burden from lump-sum PAYG pensions. Intensive labor
supply L occurs in the rst period and depends only on the rst period tax rate  1, while
retirement behavior refers to the second period and depends exclusively on the second
period tax rate  2. In this case, L =  1 leads to an intensive labor supply response in
the rst period equal to L^ =    ^ 1. Substituting this together with (33) into (28) yields
d =   L
1  L  Ld 1  
R
1  R  
x
1  x
2
rRd 2: (34)
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Clearly, a permanent increase in contribution nanced at pensions (d 1 = d 2) reduces
aggregate welfare on both the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply.
We now develop a metric to evaluate the marginal excess burden of a tax, which is
dened as the marginal loss in welfare in percent of net tax revenue raised at the margin.
Using the budget relationships in (20) for a at pension system, we write the intertemporal
budget constraint as
T   1L+ ( 2 + p)  x
R
= p0 +
p   2
R
: (35)
In measuring the excess burden of a PAYG system, we must take care of the overall
impact of the behavioral response on the public budget. Not only the tax  2 but also the
spending p distorts labor market participation of older workers. A policy-induced trend
to early retirement erodes the contribution tax base and also generates extra pension
claims. For this reason, the change in contribution revenues would capture only a part,
perhaps relatively unimportant, of the overall scal cost of early retirement. We thus
need to consider the participation tax revenue in the second period, equal to ( 2 + p)x =
Rx. It measures the total gain in the public budget when labor market participation is
increased from zero to x and consists of contribution payments plus expenditure savings
on pensions. The meaning of this denition is also seen from the budget constraint in (1),
C2 = RS+x+p Rx. If there where no participation at all, pension spending would have
been p. When retirement is postponed by x, the individual pays extra contributions and
foregoes pensions over this time interval, which adds up to a total loss Rx. The public
budget improves by the same amount. This participation tax revenue( 2 + p)x = p  2
is equal to maximum pension spending p, reduced by the contribution  2 from the future
generation.
With lump-sum pensions, R =  2 + p and L =  1. Using the retirement response to
an increase in contribution-nanced at pensions in (33), as well as x^ =  ^R, yields the
total impact on the present value of PAYG budget
dT =

1  L
1  L

 Ld 1 +

1  R
1  R 

 x
1  x
2
rRd 2: (36)
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According to (36), the present value of the budget impact depends on the size of the
induced labor supply response on both the intensive and extensive margins.
The marginal excess burden is dened as the marginal, income equivalent welfare loss
per additional unit of net tax revenue raised, expressed in present value over all periods.
Using (34) and (36)
    d
dT
=
L
1 L  !L +
R
1 R  !x
1  L
1 L  !L  
R
1 R  !x
; (37)
where weights !L  L=

L+ x
1 x
2
rR

and !x  x1 x 2rR=

L+ x
1 x
2
rR

indicate the relative
importance of the intensive and extensive margins, such that !L+!x = 1. Moreover, the
marginal cost of public funds is one plus the marginal excess burden
MCPF = 1 +   =
1
1  L
1 L  !L  
R
1 R  !x
: (38)
These are familiar formulas in the tax literature. In raising the contribution rate to
pay for a pension rise, this policy causes people to choose early retirement. Each unit of
earlier retirement causes a double burden on the scal budget equal to the participation
tax rate. The general structure of the MCPF formula in (38) is parallel to that found
in Kleven and Kreiner (2006), who also considered the welfare consequences of tax and
benet changes in a static model, and Immervoll et al. (2007). Their analyses is applied
here with appropriate modications to characterize the excess burden of public pensions.
The excess burden with respect to the retirement decision is driven by the measures of
the participation tax rate, or implicit retirement tax, as suggested by Gruber and Wise
(1999b, 2005. The relevant retirement elasticity for Germany is estimated by Börsch
Supan (2000).
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4 Parametric Pension Reform
4.1 Stronger Tax-Benet Link
Many countries recently reformed their PAYG pension systems. To undo some of their
damaging labor market e¤ects and, in particular, to raise the average retirement age,
policy makers have aimed primarily at strengthening the tax-benet link and introducing
a greater degree of actuarial fairness. For example, in order to strengthen old age labor
market participation, Austria has introduced substantial supplements to regular pensions
when work is continued beyond the statutory retirement age and pension discounts, or
penalties, for early retirement. Further, the length of the calculation period has been
signicantly prolonged: in other words, the number of years of past earnings that count
towards future pensions has been increased. In addition, the pension system was harmo-
nized so that some occupational groups, such as civil servants who previously received
pensions largely unrelated to past earnings, have been integrated into the same earnings-
linked system. These measures represent di¤erent ways of strengthening the tax-benet
link by making it more widespread, thereby reducing the importance of at lump-sum
pensions.15
Within our simple framework, we can analyze this policy initiative by considering
an increase in the xed component m0 of the conversion factor m = = (1  x) + m0.
To avoid complex calculations that yield no additional insight, we set m0 = 0 in the
initial equilibrium and allow  2 [0; 1]. Since this clearly raises earnings-linked pension
levels, we endogenously cut the lump-sum pension component b to satisfy the PAYG
budget constraint when the statutory contribution rate is kept constant. Appendix B,
see (B.6)(B.10), computes the partial e¤ects on the size of the earnings-linked pension
and the participation tax rate. Among other results, we nd that an increased conversion
factor directly raises the pension level. It also lowers the e¤ective tax rate of young
workers, because they individually expect larger future pensions when working more.
15See Knell et al. (2006) for an informative description of pension reform in Austria.
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This stimulates labor supply, augments the assessment base, and further raises pension
size. However, a larger pension raises the participation tax rate. On the other hand,
this incentive for early retirement is mitigated by the fact that the policy measure also
raises the pension supplement p that becomes available upon choosing a marginally higher
retirement age. It must be kept in mind, nevertheless, that the at pension is endogenously
cut to sustain the PAYG budget, which, in turn, causes people retire later. To verify our
logic, we solve the system (A.2) and (A.4) and note that  0R = " = 0, starting from a
position of m0 = 0
x^ =  
h
@p
@m0
  @R
@m0
i
1
r
dm0
1 R > 0;
db =  
h
R
1 R
x
1 x
@R
@m0
+ @p
@m0
i
1
rdm0 < 0;
(39)
where r is given in (22). The sign of the comparative static e¤ects is determining by
evaluating the terms dened in (B.7)(B.9), which yields
@p
@m0
  @R
@m0
= 

(1  x) +    L
1  L  L

> 0: (40)
Hence, a tighter tax-benet link raises the retirement age, x^ > 0, and reduces the lump-
sum pension level, db < 0. In addition, the partial derivatives in (B.7)(B.10) imply
@R=@m0 > 0 and @p=@m0 > 0. Moreover, the lump-sum pension component falls to such
an extent that in equilibrium, despite of the direct e¤ect @R=@m0 > 0, the participation
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tax rate declines, which increases x. The solution is illustrated in Figure 2.
b
x
PAYG budgetretirement
0m
0m
Fig. 2: Tighter Tax Benet Link
As indicated, although the partial e¤ect on the participation tax rate in (B.10) is posi-
tive, it falls in equilibrium due to the large reduction in lump-sum pensions, which results
in a later retirement date. Noting the pension formula (14) and taking the di¤erential of
(15), with " = 0 due to m0 = 0 initially, yields equilibrium response of the participation
tax
^R =
@p
@m0
dm0
1  R +
db
1  R   (1  x)
@p0
@m0
dm0
1  R < 0: (41)
Substituting the equilibrium changes of retirement age and lump-sum pensions as noted
in (39) and using the partial e¤ects stated in (40) and Appendix B, we nd, after some
lengthy computations, x^ =    ^R > 0, with x^ > 0 as in (39). This reects that fact that
all retirement incentives are summarized in the participation tax rate.
The intensive labor supply response of young workers, L^ =    ^L, depends on the
equilibrium change of the implicit tax rate L =  [1  (1  x)m=R]. Since the statutory
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contribution rate remains constant, the log-di¤erential yields
^L =  (1  x) =R
1  L  dm0; (42)
which implies that the tax-benet link reduces the implicit tax rate on young workers,
thereby stimulating intensive labor supply. Under the conditions stated above, a stronger
tax-benet link reduces the e¤ective tax rates on both margins of aggregate labor supply,
leading to (potentially) substantial welfare gains according to (28).
4.2 Greater Actuarial Fairness
We next explore the benets of introducing a greater degree of actuarial fairness. Specif-
ically, we rst consider the e¤ects of strengthening the tax-benet link by raising the
conversion factor so that pension earnings are more sensitive to the retirement date. The
scenario, thus, involves an increase in the parameter , when the conversion factor is
m = = (1  x), with m0 = 0. The lump-sum pension must be cut to keep the system
sustainable when past earnings translate into more generous pensions. The appendix
calculates in (B.11)(B.14), for any given retirement date x, the partial e¤ects and nds
that the participation tax rate is reduced by16 @R=@ =   , while the earnings-linked
pension component becomes larger, @p=@ > 0. Solving (A.2) and (A.4) yields17
x^ =   +@p=@r  d1 R > 0;
db =  
h
1 +  L
1 L

L+

1  R
1 R

x
i

(1 x)r  d;
(43)
which imply an increase in the retirement date, x^ > 0. Except for extreme cases, the
lump-sum pension must be cut, db < 0, when the earnings-linked component becomes
16In the specic case considered here, we can in fact get a closed form solution: since z0 = 1, we have
p0 =  [m+m0z]. Using R =  + p  (1  x) p0 and (1  x)m0 = m yields R = b+ (1  )  .
17If the coe¢ cient m0 = 0 so that (1  x)m0 = m, the following restrictions can be used: z0 = 1 and
	 = 0 = z00, hence  0R = " = 0, as well as @R=@ =   . From (B.13), (1  x) @p
0
@ = +
h
z
1 x +m
@z
@
i
=
 + @p@ , where
@p
@ =

1 x

z +  L1 L L

and    L = =R.
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larger.18 Moreover, the policy change is strictly welfare improving. Since " = 0, the
participation tax rate changes by ^R =
@p
@
d
1 R +
db
1 R   (1  x)
@p0
@
d
1 R . As before,
substituting the solutions from (43) yields, after some manipulations, the result satisfying
x^ =    ^R. The rise in  also lead to a decline in the implicit tax rate on younger
workers. The results with respect to the e¤ective tax rates is summarized as follows
^R =   + @p=@r
d
1  R < 0; ^L =  

R
d
1  L < 0: (44)
Since both e¤ective tax rates fall, aggregate labor supply on the intensive and extensive
margins is stimulated. Depending on the magnitude of the initial labor market distortions,
aggregate e¢ ciency improves.
The scenario discussed above not only introduces more actuarial fairness, but also
makes earnings-linked pensions more generous, since it raises the conversion factor. To a
large extent, however, recent pension reform policy is dictated by the need to restore scal
sustainability, a goal hardly compatible with replacing a greater part of past earnings. To
be closer to actual policy challenges, we evaluate the following reform scenario: raise the
parameter  to introduce more actuarial fairness and at the same time cut the coe¢ cient
m0 to prevent pensions from becoming more generous:
dm0 =   d
1  x ) dm =
m
1  x  dx: (45)
The scenario implies that the conversion factor m = = (1  x)+m0 remains constant for
any given retirement behavior. The conversion factor increases only if the policy measure
leads workers to postpone retirement. To keep calculations simple, we start from an initial
situation of m0 = 0 so that m0 = m= (1  x).19
To derive the comparative static e¤ects and the welfare consequences of this policy
experiment, we need to determine the partial e¤ects on pensions p, the participation tax
rate R and the pension supplement p0. To do so, we impose the policy change dm0 =   d1 x
18A limited countervailing e¤ect arises, since the pension is paid over a shorter period, which allows
the possibility of a larger pension, when retirement is postponed.
19Strictly speaking, m0 < 0 after the policy change, to o¤set the increase in m due to a higher .
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and evaluate derivatives at the initial position m0 = 0 and m = = (1  x). Using (B.7)
(B.8) and (B.12)(B.13), as well as (1  x)m=R =    L from the denition of the
e¤ective tax rate, shows that the partial e¤ects on pension earnings completely cancel.
The result is due to the fact that the policy initiative, for a given retirement date, holds
the conversion factor constant
@p
@
d+ @p
@m0
dm0 =
h
(1  x) @p
@
  @p
@m0
i
d
1 x = 0;
@R
@
d+ @R
@m0
dm0 =
h
(1  x) @R
@
  @R
@m0
i
d
1 x =  z d1 x < 0;
@p0
@
d+ @p
0
@m0
dm0 =
h
(1  x) @p0
@
  @p0
@m0
i
d
1 x =
z
1 x
d
1 x > 0:
(46)
The partial e¤ect on the participation tax rate follows upon substituting (B.10) and (B.14)
and is negative: greater actuarial fairness is designed to reduce the participation tax rate
and to encourage workers to postpone retirement. To achieve this, the government must
increase the pension supplement p0 that becomes available for each instant of postponed
retirement.
The equilibrium impact of the policy reform is found, as before, by solving the system
(A.2) and (A.4). Using the results given above and noting  0R = " = 0 if evaluated at
m0 = 0, we calculate
x^ =   1
1  R
z
r
d
1  x; db =  
R
1  R
x
1  x
z
r
d
1  x; (47)
where r = 1 + R
1 R
x
1 x. As indicated, the policy experiment in (45) keeps pension
size xed if retirement date does not change, but o¤ers larger pension supplements when
retirement is postponed. Consequently, it succeeds in reducing the participation tax
rate and encouraging later retirement. The scenario unambiguously raises the lump-sum
pension b since it expands the assessment base and shortens the retirement period.
In equilibrium, with " = 0, the e¤ect of retirement choice x on R disappears. Substi-
tution of (46) shows that the participation tax rate falls by
^R =   z
(1  R)r
d
1  x < 0; (48)
which conrms x^ =    ^R and is consistent with (47). A welfare evaluation employing
(28) requires the calculation of the e¤ect on the e¤ective tax rate on young workers
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and their intensive labor supply response. Imposing the policy change noted above and
calculating the di¤erential of the implicit tax rate L =  [1  (1  x)m=R] at m0 = 0
yields
dL =

R
 [mdx  (1  x) dm] = 0: (49)
According to (49), the e¤ective tax rate on young workers is independent of the policy
scenario in (45), implying that period labor supply remains constant. The experiment
fails to reduce distortions faced by young workers and, thus, cannot promise any further
e¢ ciency gains on that margin. The main advantage of the policy package is the reduction
of the participation tax rate. By encouraging later retirement, it potentially results in
welfare gains on the extensive margin.
5 Conclusion
The potential labor market impact of pension reform is a prime policy concern. Aging
and the socioeconomic trend to early retirement not only impose nancial stress on the
system, but are also an important factor in restraining aggregate employment. The need
to provide incentives for the continuing labor market participation of older workers has,
thus, received increasing attention among policy makers. For example, the tax character
and the potentially harmful impact on labor supply incentives of prime-age workers is
a particular concern. In this context, recent reform initiatives in many countries aim
at reducing the large participation tax rates incorporated in current pension systems.
For instance, pension formulas have been modied to o¤er income supplements for each
year of postponed retirement and pension penalties have been imposed when earlier
retirement is chosen. Other measures seek to improve work incentives of younger, prime-
age workers by strengthening the tax-benet link. In Austria concrete examples of pension
reforms include the harmonizationof the pension system, with the consequence that
civil servants and other employee groups who have previously received lump-sum pensions
unrelated to past earnings, are now included in the same earnings-linked pension system.
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Austria, along with other countries, has also lengthened the calculation period for the
pension assessment base so that not only the best ve years, but also the entire earnings
history count in determining the size of the pension. These purpose of these reforms is
to raise the share of prime-age workers who are subject to a tax-benet link and will, as
a result, perceive that their pension contributions have a lower tax component. As such,
these reforms are suitable to stimulate labor supply and employment among younger
workers.
This paper has proposed a simple model that captures the important interaction be-
tween labor supply incentives of prime-age workers and incentives for labor market par-
ticipation of workers near retirement. We show that the joint policy goals of stimulating
young and old age labor supply can conict with each other. In a system with a tax-benet
link, raising the retirement age tends to raise the e¤ective tax faced by young, prime-age
workers. When the retirement date is postponed, the extra pension benets expected
by a young worker from increased earnings are obtained only in the more distant future
and over a shorter retirement period. Consequently, these future earnings are discounted
more heavily, which raises the tax component for any given pension contribution. For the
same reasons, we nd that an exogenous, socioeconomic trend to early retirement raises
prime-age labor supply, which tends to o¤set the reduction in aggregate employment due
to lower old age labor market participation. In view of this trade-o¤, policy makers should
be careful to design reforms in a way that strengthens both margins of labor supply in an
aging society.
Fortunately, our analysis shows that some recent reform approaches can attain this
objective. If it is possible to cut lump-sum pensions, for example, by harmonizingthe
system, an increase in the tax-benet link indeed tends to stimulate both margins of la-
bor supply, regardless of whether the link is also made actuarially fair with respect to the
retirement date. However, if the conversion factor determining pension size conditional
on past earnings is made more sensitive with respect to retirement age without raising
its overall magnitude, then such a reform, while encouraging old age labor market par-
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ticipation, does not stimulate employment among prime-age workers. Nevertheless, this
scenario shows that any given increase in the tax-benet link is much preferred if it is
also made actuarially fair in the sense of Gruber and Wise, compared to one that is not
sensitive to a workers retirement choice.
Appendix
A Comparative Statics
This appendix computes comparative static results. We log-linearize the model and com-
pute proportional rates of change relative to a given initial equilibrium. Intensive labor
supply in (11) depends exclusively on pension parameters and the retirement date. Tak-
ing account of this, equilibrium is given by a retirement date x and a at pension b that
satisfy the optimality condition for retirement (12) subject to (14) and budget balance of
the PAYG system (20).
Pension earnings given by (14) are a complex function of the parameters of the system:
p (x; b;  ;m0; ) = m (x;m0; ) z (x;  ;m0; ) + b. Obviously, p0  @p=@x is independent
of the at pension b. We derive how the relative change ^R  dR= (1  R) of the par-
ticipation tax rate depends on changes in retirement behavior, x, and pension parameters
 , m0,  and b. The e¤ective tax rate R   + p  (1 x)p0 is dened in (15). Dene the
elasticity "   0Rx= (1  R) where  0R is given in (17), and note that pension parameters
a¤ect the participation tax rate by their impact on p and p0
^R = "  x^+ db
1  R +
@R
@
d
1  R +
@R
@m0
dm0
1  R +
@R
@
d
1  R : (A.1)
The derivatives of R will be specied later when we discuss specic policy scenarios.
Substituting (A.1) into the retirement response noted in (13), we obtain, after rearranging,
the following equation for the impact on retirement in terms of parametric shifts and the
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change db in the endogenous level of at pensions:
x^ =   
1 + "
1
1  R

db+
@R
@
d +
@R
@m0
dm0 +
@R
@
d+ (1  R) ^

: (A.2)
This equation corresponds to the retirement locus in Figures 1 and 2. It is downward
sloping since a more generous at pension induces, holding ( ;m0; ) constant, earlier
retirement.
The other constraint to pin down equilibrium is the condition for budget balance in
(20):   (1 + x) = (1  x) p. Taking the di¤erential of revenues and pension spending, we
obtain
(1 + x) d + dx = (1  x)

p0dx+
@p
@
d +
@p
@m0
dm0 +
@p
@
d+ db

  pdx: (A.3)
Using the fact that R =  + p  (1  x) p0, we solve for db in terms of x^ and the shifts in
the pension parameters
db =
Rx
1  x  x^+

1 + x
1  x  
@p
@

 d   @p
@m0
 dm0   @p
@
 d: (A.4)
This equation corresponds to the PAYG budget locus in Figures 1 and 2. It is upward
sloping since an increase in retirement age relaxes the pension budget and allows for a
larger at pension as long as the participation tax rate R is positive. This is intuitive
since the participation tax measures the net scal loss to households, and, thus, the net
gain to the system, when retirement is marginally postponed. The tax rate R captures
the extra tax paid plus the pension earnings foregone minus the increase in pensions
over the remaining life-time 1  x, which corresponds to the number of pensioners in the
cross-section of the population.
The solution of (A.2) and (A.4) determines the reduced-form, equilibrium expressions
for the retirement response and the size of the at, lump-sum pension payments in terms
of the changes in the system parameters ( ;m0; ) and the preference parameter . This
solution yields, in turn, the reactions of the other variables of interest: the response of
intensive labor supply of young workers through the impact of retirement age on the
implicit tax, as discussed above in (10) and (11). We can also infer the impact on the
participation tax of the old, which yields the welfare change according to (24).
34
B E¤ects on the Participation Tax Rate
Statutory Tax Rate: Appendix B calculates how pension reform a¤ects the partici-
pation tax rate: R =  +p  (1  x) p0. To do so, we must compute its partial derivatives
for a given retirement date x. Consider rst the e¤ect of an increased contribution rate
@R
@
= 1 +
@p
@
  (1  x) @p
0
@
: (B.1)
The impact on earnings-linked pensions depends on the reaction of the assessment base,
z = x + L, which, in turn, is driven by rst period labor supply in (9). Using L as
given in (6) and holding x constant, we nd that a higher contribution rate discourages
intensive labor supply and thereby erodes the assessment base

@z
@
= 
@L
@L
@L
@
=   L
1  L  L < 0: (B.2)
In calculating the e¤ect on pensions p = mz + b, we note that the conversion factor
m = 
1 x +m0 and its derivative m
0 = 
(1 x)2 =
m m0
1 x are independent of  . A higher con-
tribution rate thus a¤ects the pension level and the pension increment p0 =   [zm0 +mz0]
that is o¤ered when retirement is marginally postponed
@p
@
= m

z + 
@z
@

;
@p0
@
= m

z0 + 
@z0
@

+m0

z + 
@z
@

: (B.3)
The term z0 = 1+L0 = 1 	, with 	  L
1 L  m0R , follows from (11).20 Assuming a xed
wage elasticity of labor supply , we obtain
  dz
0
d
=  	 

1 + (1  ) L
1  L

: (B.4)
Using the relationships (1  x)m0 = m  m0 = = (1  x) and substituting the relevant
derivatives into (B.1) yields
@R
@
= 1  +m0 
h
z   (1  x)  L
1 LL
i
+ (1  x)m 	

2 + (1  ) L
1 L

:
(B.5)
20Indeed, we have m0 and not m in 	. Moreover, both m0 and m are independent of  .
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From this general expression, we deduce several cases: full actuarial fairness:  = 1,
m0 = 	 = 0, and hence @R=@ = 0. The zero participation tax rate is independent
of the remaining a positive e¤ective tax on young workers, L =   [1  1=R], which is
smaller than the statutory rate because PAYG contributions earn no interest. The other
extreme case is no tax-benet link,  = m0 = 0, so that @R=@ = 1.
The case with a xed conversion factor independent of retirement behavior, m = m0
and  = 0, yields an intermediate case. The square bracket can safely be assumed
positive, at least if the labor supply elasticity is not too large. In our simple model,
the worker-retiree ratio is (1 + x) = (1  x), which exceeds unity in a realistic setting. If,
instead, taking the e¤ective number of workers, L + x, and realistically assuming that
hours worked of young and older workers are not too di¤erent, i.e. L close to 1, we also
have z = L+ x > (1  x). Therefore, the rst two terms in the square bracket are clearly
positive. A natural assumption, which is actually stronger than required, is that the
erosion of the assessment base will not be so large as to exceed the net e¤ect of the rst
two terms in the square bracket.
It will also be instructive to consider the case of xed rst period labor supply, given by
 = 	 = 0, which again leads to an increase in the participation tax rate if the statutory
tax rate is raised, @R
@
= 1   +m0 [z   (1  x)] > 0,  2 [0; 1]. By continuity, the total
e¤ect on @R
@
remains positive at least for small values of . In any case, the inuence of
L is likely to be small, given the econometric evidence on the labor supply response of
young workers.
Tax-Benet Link: Consider the e¤ect of a tighter tax-benet linkm = = (1  x)+m0,
through a rise in m0, starting from m0 = 0. The parameter  2 [0; 1] may take arbitrary
values with  = 0 being one special case. The partial e¤ect on R =  + p  (1  x) p0 is
@R
@m0
=
@p
@m0
  (1  x) @p
0
@m0
: (B.6)
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Using L as given in (6), and holding x constant, we nd that a tax-benet link encourages
intensive labor supply and thereby expands the assessment base z = x+ L
m
@z
@m0
= m
@L
@L
@L
@m0
=
   L
1  L  L > 0: (B.7)
Raising the conversion factor m0 a¤ects the pension level, p = mz + b, and the pension
increment p0 =  [mz0 +m0z] in (16) by
@p
@m0
= 

z +m
@z
@m0

;
@p0
@m0
= 

z0 +m
@z0
@m0
+m0
@z
@m0

: (B.8)
Since we evaluate the policy change starting from m0 = 0 in the initial equilibrium,
the marginal e¤ect of later retirement on the assessment base is unity, z0 = 1 + L0 =
1. Given m0 = 0 initially, the term (1  x)m =  and the e¤ective tax rate L =
 [1  (1  x)m=R] remain constant, and therefore, rst period labor supply, is indepen-
dent of retirement age. Consequently
@p0
@m0
= 

1 +m0
@z
@m0

: (B.9)
Combining (B.6)(B.9) and noting that m0 = 0 implies (1  x)m0 = m, yields
@R
@m0
=  [z   (1  x)] > 0: (B.10)
When strengthening the tax-benet link by raising m0 from an initial value of m0 = 0,
the partial e¤ect on the participation tax rate reduces to @R=@m0 =  [z   (1  x)] > 0,
where the square bracket can safely be assumed positive as before.
More Actuarial Fairness: Raising the parameter  not only introduces a tighter tax-
benet link, but also makes it fairer. Again, we assume m0 = 0 initially. The partial
impact on the participation tax rate R =  + p  (1  x) p0 is
@R
@
=
@p
@
  (1  x) @p
0
@
: (B.11)
Using L in (6), and holding x constant, we nd the pension base z = x+ L grows by
@z
@
=
@L
@L
@L
@
=
L
1  L 

R
> 0: (B.12)
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The conversion factor changes by @m=@ = 1= (1  x) and @m0=@ = 1= (1  x)2. The
tax-benet link thus a¤ects the pension level p = mz + b and the pension increment
p0 =  [m0z +mz0] in (16) according to
@p
@
= 

z
1  x +m
@z
@

;
@p0
@
= 

z
(1  x)2 +m
0 @z
@
+
1
1  x

: (B.13)
Our assumption of m0 = 0 initially implies that (1  x)m =  does not vary with x.
Later retirement thus expands the assessment base z = L+x by z0 = 1, with @z0=@ = 0.
Combining (B.11)(B.13) yields, upon using m = (1  x)m0
@R
@
=
@p
@
  (1  x) @p
0
@
=   : (B.14)
Consequently, introducing more actuarially fairness reduces the participation tax rate.
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